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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WALLKILL, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28331 
- and -
TOWN OF WALLKILL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WALLKILL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28379 
-and-
TOWN OF WALLKILL, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. 
HITSMAN, HOFFMAN & O'REILLY LLC (JOHN F. O'REILLY of counsel), 
for Town of Wallkill 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the Town of Wallkill 
(Town), to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge (Case No. U-28331) filed by the Town alleging that the Town of Wallkill Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
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Employment Act (Act) by seeking to negotiate a proposal for the continuation of the 
disciplinary procedure in an expired collectively negotiated agreement, and an improper 
practice charge (Case No. U-28379) filed by PBA alleging that the Town violated §209-
a.1 (d) of the Act by refusing to continue to negotiate for a successor agreement until 
PBA formally withdrew its disciplinary proposal.1 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated to a record that included the pleadings 
and the exhibits attached thereto. Following briefing by both parties, the ALJ issued a 
decision dismissing the Town's charge alleging that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act, and finding that the Town engaged in bad faith negotiations in violation of §209-
a. 1(d) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Town asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to dismiss PBA's 
charge as moot based upon the terms of a memorandum of agreement between the 
parties. In addition, the Town urges reversal of the ALJ's decision on the grounds that 
the record establishes that its conduct in negotiations did not constitute a violation of 
§209-a. 1 (d) of the Act, and that the conduct of PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
Finally, the Town challenges the ALJ's remedial order requiring the Town to post a 
notice stating that it will forthwith refrain from negotiating in bad faith. PBA supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. In November 2007, the parties began 
1
 42 PERB ^[4583 (2009). 
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negotiations for an agreement to commence on January 1, 2006. At the time that 
negotiations commenced, the terms and conditions, of employment for unit employees 
were set forth in an expired collectively negotiated agreement (expired agreement), as 
modified by subsequent memoranda of agreements and an interest arbitration award 
for the period January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2005. Among the employment 
terms that were continued was a negotiated police disciplinary procedure set forth in 
Article 29 of the expired agreement.2 
In its November 2007 negotiation proposals, the Town sought PBA's agreement 
to extirpate Article 29 from any successor agreement. At the negotiations session on 
January 22, 2008, PBA presented a proposal to continue the terms of Article 29 under a 
new agreement. During that bargaining session, the Town notified PBA that it 
considered PBA's proposal to continue the Article 29 disciplinary procedures to be a 
prohibited subject of negotiations. 
At an April 16, 2008 negotiations session, the Town again proposed the 
elimination of Article 29, and it demanded that PBA formally abandon its proposal to 
continue the contractual disciplinary procedures. PBA representatives refused to 
withdraw its proposal to continue the Article 29 disciplinary proposals. 
On May 2, 2008, the Town sent PBA a letter stating that an improper practice 
charge was being filed due to PBA's refusal to withdraw its proposal to continue the 
terms of Article 29. In addition, the Town cancelled the bargaining session scheduled 
for May 5, 2008, and stated it would not agree to continue to engage in negotiations 
until such time as PBA agreed to withdraw its proposal to continue the disciplinary 
2
 In January 2007, the Town Board (Board) enacted a Local Law for the purpose of 
creating a new Town police disciplinary procedure to replace Article 29 of the expired 
agreement based upon the Town's legal opinion that the negotiated procedure was a 
prohibited subject of negotiations and unenforceable. 
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procedures contained in Article 29. 
Throughout the negotiations, the Town repeatedly reiterated its position that a 
police disciplinary procedure is a prohibited subject, and it demanded that PBA refrain 
from seeking to negotiate the subject. During those negotiations, PBA presented its 
police discipline proposal as being interrelated and interconnected with its other 
proposals on wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. PBA took 
the position that if the negotiated disciplinary procedure were found to be a prohibited 
subject or it acceded to the Town's legal position regarding police discipline, PBA would 
have the right to withdraw or alter its other pending proposals, and make other 
proposals. 
On November 21, 2008, the parties entered into a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) for a successor agreement commencing on January 1, 2006 that did not 
eliminate or expressly continue the terms of Article 29. Instead, the parties agreed to 
reserve their respective rights and arguments in cases pending before PERB and the 
courts: 
H. Each party reserves its rights, without prejudice, regarding its positions 
concerning police discipline that is the subject of court litigation 
pending in Orange County Supreme Court and in any court appeal(s) 
taken. This agreement does not constitute a waiver by either party to 
continue such litigation, nor shall this agreement in any way modify or 
alter the pre-existing disciplinary procedures contained in the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
I. Each party reserves its rights, without prejudice, regarding its positions 
concerning police discipline that is the subject of proceeding(s) 
pending before the New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board (PERB), and in any administrative and/or judicial appeal(s) 
taken. This agreement does not constitute a waiver by either party to 
continue such PERB matters, nor shall this agreement in any way 
modify or alter the pre-existing disciplinary procedures contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
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DISCUSSION 
Contrary to the Town's exceptions, the fact that, the parties entered into an MOA 
after the filing of PBA's improper practice charge, does not render the charge moot, but 
is relevant in examining the appropriate remedy.3 During the processing of a charge, 
the concepts under the mootness doctrine may be applied when the charge involves 
unique facts and circumstances, and only when the application of the doctrine is 
consistent with the policies of the Act.4 
We conclude that the application of the mootness doctrine, under the facts and 
circumstances of the present case, would be inconsistent with the Act. A party does 
not have the right to cease participating in negotiations because it may believe that the 
other party's bargaining position constitutes an improper practice.5 The refusal to 
continue to negotiate in good faith violates a central obligation under the Act. 
Resumption of negotiations following the filing of an improper practice charge, which 
results in an agreement, does not render moot the breach of that duty.6 
The Town's reliance upon the terms of the parties' MOA to support its argument 
is misplaced. The MOA expressly states that each party reserves its rights and 
arguments in the charges pending at PERB with respect to police discipline, and that 
neither party waives the right to pursue its respective charge. The MOA did not provide 
that the parties' respective charges in the present case would be withdrawn. 
3
 Westchester County Medical Center and Westchester County, 13 PERB 1J3038 
(1980); CSEA, 25 PERB 1J3057 (1992); Town of Huntington, 27 PERB 1J3039 (1994); 
Dutchess Comm Coll, 41 PERB 1J3029 at 3131, note 16 (2008). 
4
 City of Peekskill, 26 PERB P062 (1993); Solvay Teachers Assoc, 28 PERB 1J3024 
(1995). 
5
 Schenectady PBA, 21 PERB P022 (1988). 
6
 See, CSEA, 25 PERB P057 (1992). 
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Therefore, based upon the nature of the Town's conduct, and the express terms 
of the parties' MOA, we find no merit to the Town's mootness argument. 
Next, we turn to the Town's exceptions challenging the merits of the ALJ's 
decision finding that the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act, and dismissing the 
Town's charge alleging that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
We affirm the ALJ's finding that the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by 
unilaterally discontinuing negotiations after three bargaining sessions over a 
disagreement with PBA's bargaining positions because it views the negotiation of police 
disciplinary procedure as being prohibited. Under the Act, a party may not condition 
continued negotiations on the other party's capitulation to a legal argument, agreement 
to a negotiations proposal or the withdrawal of a negotiations proposal. Furthermore, 
the courts and PERB have repeatedly rejected the Town's argument that the subject of 
the Town's police disciplinary procedure is prohibited.7 As a result, we need not 
readdress that legal argument. 
Contrary to the Town's argument, the ALJ did not err in dismissing the Town's 
improper practice charge alleging PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act. In support of its 
exceptions, the Town cites PBA's efforts to negotiate the continuation of the negotiated 
disciplinary procedures, and PBA's refusal to withdraw the proposal despite the Town's 
legal argument. As previously noted, the subject of the disciplinary procedures for 
Town police is not prohibited, and therefore PBA did not violate the Act by insisting on 
• Town of Wallkill v CSEA, 42 PERB 1J7508 (Orange County Supreme Court 2008); 
Town of Wallkill, 42 PERB P017 (2009), pet dismissed Town of Wallkill v New York 
State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 43 PERB 1J7005 (Albany County Supreme Court 2010). See 
also, Town of Wallkill v Town of Wallkill PBA, 56 AD3d 482, 42 PERB fl7506 (2d Dept 
2008), Iv denied 12 NY3d 709, 42 PERB TJ7507 (2009). 
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negotiating its proposal.8 
In addition, we find nothing in the stipulated record to support the conclusion 
that PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by stating during negotiations that its 
disciplinary proposal is interrelated with its other proposals. During negotiations, a party 
is entitled to seek to have its proposals treated as interrelated or treated separately so 
long as the party's overall conduct evinces a sincere desire to reach an agreement.9 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to PBA's statements about its future position 
in negotiations if the subject of police discipline was found to be a prohibited. Such 
statements alone are insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the duty to negotiate in 
good faith pursuant to §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
Finally, the recommended remedial order requiring the Town to post a notice is 
fully consistent with our precedent.10 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
and affirm the decision of the ALJ and her proposed remedial order. 
In her decision, the ALJ relied upon State of New York, 37 PERB U3008 (2004) to 
conclude that a party's insistence that a prohibited subject may be negotiated prior to 
impasse does not violate the duty to negotiate in good faith. Although State of New 
York, supra, does state, citing to Peekskill Cent Sch Dist, 16 PERB 1J3075 (1983) and 
Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Assn, 10 PERB 1J3029 (1977), that both prohibited 
subjects and nonmandatory demands may be advanced until the final stages of the 
impasse procedures, that decision was in error. The two decisions relied upon by the 
Board in State of New York held only that a party may insist on a nonmandatory 
proposal being the subject of negotiations and mediation. The State of New York 
decision erroneously conflated the important distinctions between a nonmandatory and 
a prohibited subject; a prohibited subject may not be negotiated even before impasse. 
Therefore, we reverse State of New York with respect to its treatment of prohibited 
subjects. 
9
 See, Southampton PBA, 2 PERB 1J3011 (1969). 
10
 CSEA, supra note 6. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Town shall sign and post the attached 
notice at all physical and electronic locations customarily used by the Town to post 
notices to unit employees. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
The Town of Wallkill hereby notifies all employees in the bargaining unit represented by 
the Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent Association, Inc. that the Town of Wallkill will 
forthwith refrain from negotiating in bad faith with the Town of Wallkill Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. 
Dated By 
On behalf of the Town of Wallkill 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHAMPTON TOWN SUPERIOR OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5805 
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southampton Town Superior Officers 
Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5805 -2 
Included: All Sergeants, Detective Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains of 
the Town of Southampton Police Department. 
Excluded: All other Police Department personnel. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Southampton Town Superior Officers Association, Inc. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5913 
SPRINGS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selectedby a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
Included: All full-time and part-time Bus Drivers assigned to regular routes. 
Certification - 05913 
Excluded: Transportation Supervisor, per-diem Bus Drivers and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
\J /^/l^79vA~^^' 
//Jerome Lefkowitz.^hairpepst^r 
s Sheila S. Cole( Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRI-VALLEY ESSENTIAL SUPPORT STAFF 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT/NEA/AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5957 
TRI-VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
• Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Tri-Valley Essential Support Staff 
Association, NYSUT/AFT/NEA/AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5957 -2 
Included: Teacher Aide, Account Clerk, Buildings & Grounds Maintenance 
Worker I, Maintenance Helper, Custodian, Cleaner, School 
Monitor, Driver/Courier, Food Service Helper, Assistant Cook, 
Cook, Receptionist, Typist, Senior Typist, Bus Driver, LAN 
Technician and Systems Assistant Technician. 
Excluded: Senior Custodial Worker, Account Clerk (Secretary to Assistant 
Superintendent for Business), Account Clerk (Accounts Payable), 
Occupational Therapist, Buildings & Ground Maintenance Worker 
II, School District Clerk, Secretary to Superintendent, Dental 
Hygienist, Census Taker, School Bus Dispatcher, Food Service 
Manager, Payroll Clerk and all "Per Diem" Substitutes. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Tri-Valley Essential Support Staff Association, 
NYSUT/AFT/NEA/AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 




Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CATLIN HIGHWAY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5962 
TOWN OF CATLIN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Catlin Highway Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5962 
Included: Deputy Highway Superintendent and all Highway Workers. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and seasonal employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Catlin Highway Assocation. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
//Jerome Lefkovyftz, Chairperson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 338 RWDSU/UFCW, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5966 
MOUNT VERNON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 338 RWDSU/UFCW has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5966 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and regular part-time school lunchroom monitors 
employed by the Employer. 
Excluded: All other employees, including professional employees, office 
clerical employees, guards and supervisors. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Local 338 RWDSU/UFCW. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
jjAJl/l**-^' 
Jerome Lefkowitzf Chairperson 
^JJL^JCZ 
f Sheila S\ Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, MONROE 
COUNTY LOCAL 828, MONROE COUNTY PART-TIME 
EMPLOYEES UNIT 7401, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-29194 
- and -
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH PLLC (PETER J. SPINELLI and KARLEE S. BOLANOS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Monroe 
(County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA), Monroe County Local 828, Monroe County Part-Time Employees Unit 
7401 finding that the County violated §209-a.1(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it conducted a mail-ballot poll of County part-time unit 
employees with respect to their interest in continuing to be represented by CSEA.1 The 
) 
1
 At the request of the County, the Board heard oral argument on June 1, 2010 with 
respect to the County's exceptions. 
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ALJ determined that the County's actions in conducting the poll interfered with, 
restrained and coerced part-time unit employees in the exercise of their protected rights 
in violation of §209-a. 1 (a) of the Act.2 
On August 29, 2009, Albany County Supreme Court Justice Henry F. Zwack 
issued an order and judgment, pursuant to §209-a.5(d) of the Act, enjoining and 
restraining the County from continuing to solicit ballots from the part-time unit 
employees, from obtaining the results of the balloting, and from publishing or 
disseminating those results, pending a final PERB decision and order with respect to 
the present charge.3 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County asserts that the polling of the part-time unit employees did not violate 
the Act because the polling is authorized by the terms of §2.2 of the parties' collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement), the County had a good faith rationale for conducting 
the poll to determine whether a secret-ballot election was appropriate under §2.2 of the 
agreement, and the poll was conducted in a manner consistent with the Act. The 
County also contends that the ALJ erred by analyzing the lawfulness of the poll under 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), by concluding that the County's purpose in 
conducting the poll was to encourage unit employees to file a decertification petition, by 
failing to find that the County had a reasonable basis for conducting the poll, and in 
2
 42 PERB 1J4547 (2009). 
3
 New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd v County of Monroe, 42 PERB 1J7007 (Albany 
County Sup Ct 2009). 
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making various findings of fact, including her credibility determinations.4 Finally, the 
County raises two procedural issues: a) CSEA lacks standing to file the charge; b) the 
charge is deficient because it does not allege that the County is the employer. CSEA 
supports the ALJ's decision.5 
Based upon our review of the record, consideration of the parties' written and oral 
arguments, and the application of relevant precedent, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
On December 1, 2004, the Board certified CSEA as the exclusive representative 
for a unit composed of County part-time employees in various titles (part-time unit).6 
CSEA is also the certified or recognized collective representative for a unit of County 
full-time employees (full-time unit). 
The County and CSEA are parties to an agreement for the part-time unit for the 
period June 1, 2006-December 31, 2008, which expressly references PERB's 
4
 During oral argument, the County's counsel summarized its exceptions as presenting 
two essential questions for Board determination: a) whether the Act prohibits an 
employer and an employee organization from agreeing upon an alternative procedure 
distinct from the decertification procedures under the Rules, permitting the employer to 
challenge the majority status of the employee organization; and b) whether the County's 
poll complied with the applicable standards under the Act. 
5
 CSEA has not filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of its allegations that the 
County's conduct violated §§209-a.1(b), (c) and (d) of the Act. Therefore, CSEA has 
waived Board review of those legal issues, including whether the County's poll 
constitutes improper employer domination under the Act. Rules, §213.2(b)(4); Town of 
Orangetown, 40 PERB jf3008 (2007), confirmed, Town of Orangetown v New York 
State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 117008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). 
6
 37 PERB 1J3000.16 (2004). 
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certification.7 
Section 2.2 of the agreement states: 
The Union's representative status shall continue as long as it 
represents a majority of the bargaining unit employees, 
provided that if the County receives evidence that thirty 
percent or more of the unit employees are questioning this 
status, the parties will conduct a secret ballot election 
conducted by PERB to determine representation status. 
Pursuant to §9.3 of the agreement, unless one of the parties sends a written 
notice between 90 and 120 days prior to the expiration of the agreement, for a change 
or the termination of the agreement, the agreement is renewed automatically for one 
additional year. 
In June 2008, the County and CSEA commenced expedited negotiations for a 
successor agreement for the full-time unit. During those negotiations, the County was 
represented by Director of Human Resources Brayton M. Connard (Connard) and its 
counsel Peter J. Spinelli (Spinelli); CSEA was represented by Labor Relations Specialist 
Debbie Lee (Lee). It is undisputed that no County employees in the CSEA full-time unit 
participated in the negotiations.8 Those negotiations resulted in a tentative agreement 
on October 7, 2008 that was subject to approval by CSEA's full-time unit negotiations 
committee, and ratification by CSEA members in that unit. 
On December 16, 2008, Lee informed Spinelli that the full-time unit negotiations 
committee had rejected the tentative agreement. In addition, Spinelli learned that Lee 
retired as a CSEA employee, and that CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Robert Leonard. 
7
 Exhibit A, Article 2, p. 1. 
8
 Joint Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Spinelli, ffiJ5-6. 
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(Leonard) would be replacing her as chief CSEA negotiator.9 Subsequent negotiations 
between the parties regarding the full-time unit proved unsuccessful, and CSEA filed a 
declaration of impasse to which the County objected.10 
On March 24, 2009, Leonard sent an email to Connard and Spinelli requesting 
the commencement of negotiations for the part-time unit. The following day, Spinelli 
responded with an email stating: 
Yesterday we offered the Full-Time unit two dates in that 
week: April 30 and May 1. Whichever one you don't select 
for Full-Time, the County is willing to offer for the 
commencement of Part-time negotiations (same time -
2:00 to 5:00 p.m.)11 
The parties agreed to commence negotiations for the part-time unit on May 1, 
2009 at 2:00 p.m at CSEA's Rochester satellite office. Prior to May 1, 2009, Connard 
was aware that the CSEA part-time unit had a negotiations team.12 On the morning of 
May 1, 2009, Spinelli telephoned Connard to find out whether CSEA had submitted a 
written notice for negotiations within the timeframe set forth in §9.3 of the agreement. 
During their conversation,. Connard stated that he did not recall such a notice, and that 
he did not have sufficient time to review his records priprto the scheduled negotiations 
session to confirm his recollection.13 
9
 Joint Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Spinelli, Tf7. Exhibit D. 
10
 Joint Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Spinelli, ffl}8-10. 
11
 Joint Exhibit 2. 
12
 Transcript, p. 70. 
13
 Transcript, p. 54. 
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CSEA was represented at the May 1, 2009 negotiations session by Leonard, 
CSEA Monroe County Local 828 president Donna Miller (Miller), and County part-time 
employee Donald Wallace (Wallace). The County representatives included Connard, 
Spinelli and Karlee S. Bolanos (Bolanos), another attorney for the County. 
During the session, Leonard identified the part-time unit employees who were on 
the CSEA negotiations committee, and requested that the County grant release time for 
them to attend future negotiations sessions.14 He also stated that Mary Gallina (Gallina) 
was no longer CSEA part-time unit president. Although Gallina separated from County 
employment in March 2009, Leonard thought that she was still on a leave of absence 
due to a long-term illness.15 
Leonard informed County representatives that CSEA had placed the part-time 
unit in administratorship, with Miller as the administrator.16 According to Bolanos, 
Leonard and Miller explained that an administratorship is an internal CSEA procedure 
under its bylaws.17 The explanation was provided because County representatives 
14
 Transcript, pp.16-18, 21-22, 31, 45, 92, 99. According to Bolanos's negotiation notes, 
Leonard identified, by name and department, a total of eight part-time unit employees 
on the committee in addition to Leonard and Miller. In addition, her notes reflect that 
release time was requested. Respondent Exhibit 2. 
15
 Transcript, pp. 9, 31. 
16
 Transcript, pp. 16-17, 31, 54-56, 88, 90, 99, 116. 
17
 During the hearing, witnesses differed as to whether Leonard stated that the part-time 
unit did not have officers. Nevertheless, CSEA did not present any evidence that the 
part-time unit had incumbent officers at the time of the negotiations session, and 
Leonard conceded on cross-examination that, if the part-time unit had officers, it would 
not have been in administratorship. Transcript, p. 32. 
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were unfamiliar with the term.18 
In her decision, the ALJ resolved conflicting testimony among the witnesses with 
respect to certain disputed facts. The ALJ credited Miller's testimony that County 
representatives were told that part-time unit elections were scheduled. The ALJ also 
credited Bolanos's testimony that Leonard had stated that he was trying to encourage 
part-time unit employees to become unit officers.19 
During the meeting, Spinelli asked Leonard whether CSEA had sent a timely 
notice for negotiations pursuant §9.3 of the agreement, and insisted that CSEA would 
have to request a County waiver if a timely notice had not been sent. Leonard stated 
that he would need additional time to determine whether his predecessor, former CSEA 
Labor Relations Specialist Lee, had sent the notice.20 Following a caucus, Leonard 
returned and informed the County representatives that he had spoken with Lee by 
telephone, and she had told him that the notice had been sent.21 In his negotiation 
notes, Connard included a reminder to himself to review the County's records after 
returning to his office, to determine whether a notice had been received.22 
Although there is conflicting evidence as to whether Leonard requested a waiver 
18
 Transcript, pp. 90-91. 
19
 42 PERB 1J4547 at 4682; Transcript, pp. 92, 116. 
20
 Transcript pp. 20, 22. 
21
 Transcript, pp. 44, 60. 
22
 Respondent Exhibit 1; Transcript p. 60. During his testimony, Leonard acknowledged 
his subsequent discovery that the notice pursuant to §9.3 of the agreement had not 
been sent. Transcript, p. 44. 
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from the County of the notice requirement or suggested that CSEA may request a 
waiver, it is not disputed that through an exchange of emails the parties agreed to 
continue negotiations for a successor agreement.23 The agreement to continue 
negotiations occurred more than two weeks prior to the County initiating its poll of the 
unit membership. 
On May 19, 2009, Leonard received telephonic and email messages from 
Connard informing him that the County was conducting a poll of the unit members. On 
the same day, the County mailed to each part-time unit employee a packet of materials 
that included a cover letter from the County, a survey information form and confidential 
survey ballot, a set of directions, and envelopes for mailing the ballots to an accounting 
firm.24 The cover letter stated, inter alia, that: CSEA began representing the unit in 
2005 following a card check; unit members are required to pay dues; CSEA delayed 
requesting negotiations for a successor agreement until after the prior agreement 
expired; the part-time unit has no officers, is in "administratorship" with no elections 
scheduled; and under the agreement if the County receives evidence that 30 percent or 
more of the unit employees question CSEA's status, "a secret ballot election will be held 
to determine if CSEA should remain your union representative." 
The enclosed ballot form asked the unit members to answer the following 
question: 
23
 Joint Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Spinelli, Exhibit F. 
24
 Exhibits D, E, F and G. The content of the County's cover letter and set of directions 
are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. 42 PERB ^4547 at 4676-4678. 
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DO YOU WISH TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CSEA)? 
• NO • YES 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our discussion with the two procedural issues raised by the County: 
CSEA's standing to file and pursue the charge and the alleged deficiency in the charge. 
Based upon our certification of CSEA as the exclusive representative for the part-
time unit, along with the terms of the parties' agreement, we reject the County's 
argument that CSEA lacks standing. The agreement's preamble identifies "the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Monroe County Part-
Time Employees Unit and Local 828" as a single "Union."25 The agreement does not 
include a recognition clause modifying our certification or a negotiated provision treating 
the identified Unit and Local as anything other than internal subdivisions within CSEA's 
structure. The complete lack of merit to the County's argument is established by its 
answer, which expressly admits to CSEA's description of the Monroe County Local 828 
and the Monroe County Part-Time Employees Unit 7401 as CSEA subdivisions.26 
We find an equivalent lack of merit to the County's argument that CSEA's charge 
should be dismissed on the grounds that CSEA did not allege in the charge that the 
County is the public employer. Although the content of a charge filed under §204.1 (b) 
^ Exhibit A, Article 1, p. 1. 
26
 ALJ Exhibit 1, Details of Charge, fl2; ALJ Exhibit 2,1J5(b). The ballot drafted by the 
County also references "the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA)," thereby 
undercutting its standing claim. 
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of the Rules is subject to a liberal and reasonable construction, a liberal construction 
of CSEA's pleading is not necessary to dispose of the County's argument. The County 
is expressly named as the public employer in the first paragraph of CSEA's details of 
charge.28 
Next, we turn to the County's assertion that the ALJ erred in analyzing the 
lawfulness of the poll under PERB's decertification procedures set forth in our Rules. 
According to the County, §2.2 of the agreement constitutes a negotiated alternative 
procedure for challenging CSEA's majority status thereby waiving the limitations 
established by the decertification procedures of the Rules and precedent. In addition, it 
claims that §2.2 constitutes a source of right permitting the polling of unit members.29 
In New York City Transit Authority,20 we emphasized that we will apply traditional 
principles of contract interpretation where, as here, interpretation of an agreement is 
necessary for the resolution of the merits of an improper practice charge. In interpreting 
negotiated provisions, our aim is to discern the intent of the parties. 
Pursuant to §201.3(d) of the Rules, an employer may file a decertification petition, 
during the month before the expiration of the period of unchallenged representation 
status, to challenge the majority status of a certified employee organization in an existing 
27
 Marlboro Faculty Assoc (Schanzehbach), 29 PERB P007 (1996). 
28
 ALJ Exhibit 1, Details of Charge, f l . 
29
 Based upon the County's central reliance on §2.2 of the agreement, we reject its 
argument that the ALJ erred in interpreting the provision. Brief in Support of Monroe 
County's Exceptions, p. 14. 
41 PERB U3014 (2008). See also, County of Livingston, 30 PERB 1J3046 (1997). 
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negotiating unit, only if the employer "has a demonstrable, good-faith belief that the 
employee organization is defunct." An employer does not have standing, however, to file 
a decertification petition during the applicable window period following the expiration of an 
agreement.31 
In the present case, §2.2 of the agreement does not contain clear, unmistakable 
and unambiguous language demonstrating an intention by the parties to waive, replace 
or supplement the decertification procedures under §201.3 of our Rules.32 Instead, the 
agreement expressly states that PERB will conduct the secret ballot election to 
determine CSEA's representation status. In interpreting §2.2, we presume that at the 
time the agreement was negotiated, both parties were fully cognizant of the 
representation procedures set forth in our Rules, as well as our case law.33 
In County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, we determined that: 
[T]he policies of the Act are best served by requiring that 
representation disputes be channeled through the 
procedures available under our Rules rather than left to an 
employer's unilateral action. We believe that in this way 
instability and uncertainty in the parties' labor relations will 
be eliminated or minimized and the rights of all parties can 
best be protected.34 
31
 Rules, §201.3(e);Greece Cent Sch Dist, 18 PERB P033 (1985). 
32
 CSEA v Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 (3d Dept 1982), app dismissed, 57 
NY2d 775, 15 PERB 1J7020 (1982), affd, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB 1J7007 (1984) 
(subsequent history omitted). See also, CityofYonkers, 40 PERB 1J3001 (2007); 
MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007); County of Columbia, 41 PERB 1J3023 (2008). 
33
 See, County of Orange, 14 PERB P060 (1981); Greece Cent Sch Dist, supra note 
31; County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange, 25 PERB 1J3004 (1992). 
25 PERB P004, at 3016. 
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In that decision, we also emphasized that the parties are not prejudiced by 
requiring them to abide by our representation procedures to "effect a change in an 
established bargaining relationship, whether it be the composition of the unit or the 
identity of the bargaining agent."35 
Based upon our precedent and the lack of clear, unmistakable and unambiguous 
language in the agreement, we conclude that §2.2 was not intended by the parties to 
waive, replace or supplement our decertification procedures, which require the filing of a 
timely representation petition under the terms set forth in §201.3 of the Rules to 
decertify an incumbent employee organization.36 
We also reject the County's argument that §2.2 of the agreement is a colorable 
source of right or a legitimate basis for conducting the poll. Notably, the provision is 
silent with respect to the polling of unit members, and it does not contain any words that 
can be reasonably construed to permit the County to affirmatively solicit or survey the 
unit for information regarding the status of CSEA as the incumbent employee 
organization. In drafting §2.2, the parties chose the passive phrase "the County 
receives evidence," which contradicts the County's assertion of an affirmative contract 
right to solicit such evidence.37 We conclude, therefore, that the County's assertion that 
35
 Supra note 34. 
36
 Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board conducts representation elections in the 
private sector only upon the filing of a representation petition. See, 29 USC §159(c)(1) 
(" Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as 
may be prescribed by the Board...") (emphasis added); See also, 29 CFR §102.60, et 
seq. 
37
 See, Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition definition of "receive": "To take into 
possession and control; accept custody of, collect." 
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the poll was conducted consistent with §2.2 of the agreement is not credible. In 
addition, §2.2 is a prohibited subject of negotiations because it purports to impose a 
contractual obligation on PERB to conduct an election that is contrary to our Rules. 
As a result of our conclusion that §2.2 does not constitute a clear and unambiguous 
waiver of our Rules, or a colorable source of right for conducting the poll, we do not have to 
reach the issue whether an agreement containing an explicit waiver or grant of a right to 
poll the unit on the question of continued employee support for an incumbent employee 
organization violates the policies of the Act. 
Even if we were to find the County's purported reliance on §2.2 to be credible, 
the record does not support the County's contention that it had a good faith and 
reasonable basis for conducting the poll. The poll was initiated two weeks after the 
commencement of negotiations between the parties, and following the County's 
agreement to continue those negotiations despite its claim that CSEA had not sent the 
requisite §9.3 notice. Furthermore, the County's reliance on how CSEA administers its 
internal affairs is not a legitimate basis for conducting the poll under the Act. The fact 
that CSEA's subdivision was in administratorship under CSEA's bylaws, and without 
officers, is irrelevant to CSEA's representation status.38 Similarly, the presence of only 
one part-time unit member at the negotiations session did not reasonably raise an issue 
of CSEA's status. The evidence reveals that CSEA provided the County a list of part-
38
 Contrary to the County's exceptions, we find no basis in the record for disturbing the 
ALJ's crediting of Miller's testimony that the County was told at the meeting that unit 
elections were scheduled, and the ALJ's crediting of the testimony of Bolahos that 
Leonard stated that he was trying to attract part-time unit employees to become unit 
officers. Generally, such credibility determinations are entitled to substantial deference 
by the Board. Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB P020 (2008). 
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time unit employees on its negotiations team, and requested leave for them to attend 
future sessions.39 
Finally, we consider the County's exception challenging the ALJ's conclusion that 
its actions violate §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the County's conduct in 
this case of soliciting, polling and surveying of unit members regarding whether they 
wish to continue to be represented by CSEA constitutes conduct inherently destructive 
of the rights of organization granted by §202 of the Act. Furthermore, the record reveals 
no evidence that the County had a legitimate purpose under the Act and our Rules to 
engage in such conduct. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's finding that the County violated 
§209-a.1(a)oftheAct40 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the County violated §209- a. 1(a) of the 
Act, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining or coercing County 
employees in CSEA's part-time unit by conducting a poll, or directing a third 
party to conduct a poll, to ascertain support for CSEA among unit members; 
39
 We further note that the.County engaged in expedited negotiations with CSEA in 
2008 for the full-time unit without any full-time unit employees participating. 
40
 The County's reliance on Town of Clay, 6 PERB 1J3072 (1973), affd in relevant part 
and remanded sub nom. Town of Clay v Pub Empl Rel Bd, 45 AD2d 292, 7 PERB 
H7012 (4th Dept 1974), decision on remand, 7 PERB jf3059 (1974), modified and affd, 
51 AD2d 200, 9 PERB 1J7001 (4th Dept 1976) is misplaced. Those cases involved 
employer questioning of employees in response to a demand for recognition by an 
employee organization, where a survey is arguably relevant to an employer determining 
whether the employee organization, in fact, has majority support. 
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2. Destroy the results of the poll dated May 19, 2009, and take all steps 
reasonably necessary to ensure such destruction; 
3. Not obtain the results of the poll nor publish or disseminate the results in 
any manner; 
4. Notify CSEA in writing after the results of the poll have been destroyed; 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
e, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all part-time employees of the County of Monroe represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000 AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA), that the County of Monroe will: 
1. Not interfere with, restrain or coerce County employees in CSEA's 
part-time unit by conducting a poll, or directing a third party to 
conduct a poll, to ascertain support for CSEA among unit 
members; 
2. Destroy the results of the poll dated May 19, 2009, and take all 
steps reasonably necessary to ensure such destruction; 
3. Not obtain or seek to obtain the results of the poll nor publish or 
disseminate the results in any manner; 




County of Monroe 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AHMED MUSTAFA ELGALAD, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28671 
- and -




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
AHMED MUSTAFA ELGALAD, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (YVONNE M. MARIETTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, ESQ., OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS (KELLIE TERESE 
WALKER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Ahmed Mustafa Elgalad 
(Elgalad), pursuant to §213.2(a) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), to a decision 
made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ dismissed the improper practice 
charge filed by Elgalad against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-
CIO (UFT) alleging that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). The Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
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New York (District) is a statutory party in the underlying charge pursuant to §§205.5(d) 
and209-a(3)oftheAct. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 15, 2008, Elgalad filed the charge alleging that UFT violated the 
Act when it refused to take a grievance to step three of the contractual grievance 
procedure, and failed to respond to his letters regarding the same matter.1 
On March 26, 2010, the ALJ dismissed the charge, following a hearing, based 
upon the failure of Elgalad to present sufficient proof, and because the charge is 
untimely. On March 27, 2010, Elgalad received the ALJ's decision, and on April 16, 
2010, he filed his exceptions. Because his exceptions were not accompanied by proof 
of service on UFT and the District, as required by §213.2(a) of the Rules, Elgalad was 
requested to submit such proof to the Board. In response, Elgalad filed a letter dated 
May 25, 2010, admitting that he had not served the exceptions upon UFT and the 
District because he was unaware of that obligation under the Rules. In addition, he 
requested that the Board grant him an extension of time to serve the other parties. UFT 
opposed Elgalad's request for an extension but the District consented to the request. 
By letter dated June 11, 2010, Elgalad's request for an extension of time was 
denied by the Board after the time for the filing of exceptions had expired because he 
failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension of the 
applicable timeframe. 
1
 In his grievance, Elgalad asserted that he had a contractual right to a full-time physical 
education teaching position commencing in September 2007 because he had worked at 
Stuyvesant High School from March 2007 to June 21, 2007. 
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DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §213.2(a) of the Rules, exceptions must be filed with the Board 
within 15 working days after the receipt of a decision with proof of service of the 
exceptions on all other parties. The Board has strictly applied these requirements under 
the Rules, and the failure of a party to satisfy both requirements is grounds for denying 
the exceptions.2 
In the present case, Elgalad did not serve UFT and the District with the 
exceptions as required by the Rules and, therefore, did not file proof of service with the 
Board. His misreading of the clear and explicit service requirement under the Rules, the 
relevant part of which accompanied the ALJ's decision, does not satisfy the high 
standard necessary for demonstrating extraordinary circumstances to warrant an 
extension of time for him to comply with his obligations under §213 of the Rules.3 
Elgalad's failure to timely serve his exceptions upon the other parties 
necessitates the denial of his exceptions pursuant to both §213.2(a) of the Rules and 
our precedent strictly applying the service requirement. In reaching our decision, we 
note that in one prior decision, County of Clinton,4 we did entertain exceptions despite a 
party's failure to serve copies on the other parties on the ground that the other parties 
2
 Catskill Regional OTB, 14 PERB 1J3075 (1981); CSEA (Juszczak), 22 PERB P020 
(1989); City of Watervliet, 30 PERB ^3024 (1997); Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water 
Treatment Faculty 35 PERB TJ3037 (2002); Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent Sch Dist 
(Malcolm), 41 PERB 1J3015 (2008). 
3
 See, NYSCOPBA (Hunter), 42 PERB 1J3038 (2009) (the misreading of the notice 
accompanying the ALJ's decision did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances 
warranting an extension of time for a party to request an extension of time to file 
exceptions under §213.4 of the Rules). 
4
 13 PERBP021 (1980). 
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were not prejudiced by the failure of service.5 However, County of Clinton constitutes 
an anomaly in our case law and has been implicitly overruled by our subsequent 
decisions strictly applying the service requirement and denying exceptions that were not 
timely served consistent with §213.2(a) of the Rules. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Elgalad's exceptions are denied. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York <*? 
Jerome Lefk^witz, Chai^erson 
' Sheila S. Cole, Member 
5
 Elgalad contends, as did the petitioner in County of Clinton, that he did not 
comprehend the language of §213.2(a) of the Rules, and both sent three copies of the 
; exceptions to the Board, which they believed were to be distributed to the other parties 
by the Board. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD LEFEVRE, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29858 
- and -
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1056 
and NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
ABEL L. PIERRE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS, LLP (BETH M. MARGOLIS of counsel), for 
Respondent Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1056 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Ronald Lefevre (Lefevre) to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing, as deficient, an amended improper practice charge that alleged, 
inter alia, that Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1056 (ATU) violated §209-a.2(c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) based upon alleged deficiencies in 
the post-hearing brief submitted by ATU on behalf of Lefevre at the conclusion of a 
disciplinary arbitration between New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and ATU.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Lefevre contends that the Director erred in dismissing the 
1
 43 PERB 1J4541 (2010). 
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amended charge because ATU's post-hearing brief to the arbitrator was insufficiently 
"comprehensive" to persuade the disciplinary arbitrator to impose a penalty short of 
termination. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of Lefevre's exceptions, 
we affirm the Director's dismissal of the amended charge. 
FACTS 
On December 10, 2009, an arbitrator conducted a hearing on a grievance filed 
by Lefevre challenging misconduct charges brought by NYCTA that accused him of 
utilizing a cellular phone while operating a NYCTA bus on July 31, and October 31, 
2009. 
NYCTA presented witnesses and documentary evidence at the arbitration in 
support of its claim that Lefevre was guilty of those charges, and that he should be 
terminated. As part of its case, NYCTA cited three prior incidents of Lefevre utilizing a 
cellular phone while driving during his workday, for which he was penalized. 
During the arbitration, ATU was represented by an attorney, who called Lefevre 
to testify in his own defense. Following the arbitration, ATU's attorney submitted a brief 
to the arbitrator. In its brief, ATU argued that NYCTA had failed to prove that Lefevre 
was guilty of the charges, and urged the arbitrator to credit Lefevre's testimony over the 
testimony of NYCTA's witnesses. In the alternative, ATU argued that dismissal was too 
harsh a penalty based upon Lefevre's seven years of service, the principles of 
progressive discipline, and NYCTA's delays in processing the disciplinary charges. 
Finally, ATU disputed NYCTA's assertion that Lefevre had three prior incidents 
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involving the same misconduct, and it challenged NYCTA's pre-charge suspension of 
Lefevre. 
On January 8, 2010, the arbitrator issued his decision and award finding Lefevre 
guilty of the charges, and concluding that dismissal was the appropriate penalty. In 
reaching his decision, the arbitrator concluded that Lefevre's testimony was not 
credible, and ATU's arguments against termination unpersuasive. In sustaining the 
penalty, the arbitrator ruled that utilization of a cellular phone while driving a vehicle 
constitutes serious misconduct, and Lefevre's dismissal was appropriate under the 
doctrine of progressive discipline because he had been penalized three previous times 
for the same infraction in the prior 21 months. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation under the 
Act, a charging party must allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would demonstrate 
that the employee organization engaged in conduct that was arbitrary, discriminatory or 
founded in bad faith.2 
It is well-settled that an employee organization is entitled to a wide range of 
reasonable discretion in the processing of grievances under the Act. In the present 
case, Lefevre's apparent dissatisfaction with tactical decisions made by ATU's attorney 
in preparing the brief does not state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation. 
Although Lefevre asserts that the brief was not comprehensive enough, he fails to 
2
 Nassau Comm Coll Fed of Teachers (Staskowski), 42 PERB |[3007 (2009). 
3
 DC 37 (Maltsev), 41 PERB 1J3022 (2008). 
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specifically articulate what was lacking. Furthermore, a review of the brief, which is 
attached to Lefevre's amended charge, demonstrates a high level of competence that 
more than satisfies the applicable standards of fair representation by an employee 
organization under the Act.4 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Lefevre's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the amended charge must be, and hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 10, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowijiz, Chairp^fson 
y 
e 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
4
 TWU (Jain), 39 PERB P019 (2006). 
